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Abstract: Banking and financial system constitute a critical service for our economy. Being
able to foreseen real time attacks and failures on financial institutions network is a crucial
challenge. In order to face those problems, research tends to elaborate alert mechanisms
in order to support risk assessment, analysis and mitigation solution for real time decision-
making processes. Our previous works had proposed a multi-agent based architecture to
support that alert mechanism. This architecture exploited the Multi-agent system technology
and proposes a static assignment of functions to agents. This static assignment was a
weakness because isolating an agent or breaking the communication channel between two
of them created serious damage on the crisis management. In this paper, we complete
our previous works and make mobile the assignment of functions to agents. Our approach
exploits the concept of agent responsibility that we assigned dynamically to agent taking
into consideration the agent trust. This mobile assignement is illustrated by a case study
that aims at adopting agent’s secret key according to the sensibility of the financial context.
Keywords: trust model; responsibility; multi-agent system; bank clearing; financial critical
infrastructure
1 Introduction
Infrastructures are the basic physical and organizational structures needed for the func-
tioning of a community or society, such as banking and financial systems. These Critical
Financial Infrastructures (e.g. payment systems and clearing houses) are characterized
by being so vital to a country that the incapacity or destruction of such systems would
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public safety,
or a combination of these [Rin04]. In fact, the financial critical infrastructure (FCI) are
so important that a significant effort in making sure that they are not damaged or de-
stroyed justifies the uprising research in that field. Additionally, managing the security
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of FCI systems is a difficult task offering numerous research challenges because they are
traditionally characterized by (see Fig. 1):
• deployed on large and complex inter-institutions network, making it difficult to cover
all potential vulnerabilities which can be exploited to launch cyber-attacks against
them;
• a very strong availability requirement, i.e. FCI systems can rarely be taken down.
This can make them hard to maintain, and consequently many critical infrastructure
systems run on out-dated technology which may not have been geared to cope with
the threat picture of today;
• a major request concerns the confidentiality of the message, i.e. bank secrecy is
extremely significant for the private operations, and for the state transactions as
well. Continuously monitoring and adapting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is
mandatory.
Fig. 1: FCI security challenge
Many critical infrastructure systems including FCI are exposed to the Internet, making
cyber attacks a very real problem. According to a recent study on critical infrastructure
cyber attacks [BWIM09], “critical infrastructure owners and operators report that their IT
networks are under repeated cyber attack, often by high-level adversaries. The impacts of
such attacks are often severe, and their cost is high and borne widely“.
The situation of the FCI is that from the IT side, conceptual security is achieved via
security technology watch in order to manage new vulnerabilities and avoiding new threats
by the introduction of adapted security counter measures into the operational critical el-
ements of the infrastructure. Associated to this, the security controls are also frequently
deployed (mainly via audits) on top of the two previous actions, in order to measure the
confidence that they have on the security in place. The ultimate goal here is to guarantee
that the required controls are properly in place and that the security counter measures
and PKI regulation are adapted to the risk situations. Beside this, in certain cases, these
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critical infrastructures are interdependent (clearing processing and data exchanges) and
therefore additional complex security risks are to be considered. From the business side,
the FCI owners are more and more subject to specific regulations requiring them to main-
tain an assessment and ongoing management of systemic risks by the national financial
supervision institutions [Act02, Bas06]. A systemic risk, as defined by the European par-
liament, is a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious
negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy. All types of financial
intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may be potentially systemically important.
Our state of the art in this field [FKA10] has highlighted that many architectures has
already been elaborated to support the reaction after problem detection. Those architec-
tures are mostly elaborated based on a multi-agent system (MAS) approach that offers the
possibility to work in a decentralized and heterogeneous environment. However, we have
observed that those architectures are based on a static assignment of functions to agents.
As a consequence, isolating an agent or breaking the communication channel between two
of them could create serious damage on the management of the crisis. In this paper, we
propose an innovative approach for making dynamic the assignment of functions to agents.
Our approach exploits the concept of agent responsibility that we dynamically assign de-
pending on the crisis situation. Additionally, the crisis context makes vary the agent
ability to react (e.g. agent momentary isolated or decreased capability to quickly react).
In order to consider that constraints, we introduce the agent trust based on reputation as
a parameter that influence the assignment.
Section 2 depicts the reaction mechanism case study. Section 3 presents the respon-
sibilities model and section 4 the responsibility to agent assignment function. Section 5
introduces the trust and reputation calculus method and section 6 the dynamic assignment
of responsibilities to agents based on the reputation.
2 Reaction mechanism case study
The agents that compose the architecture are the following:
• The ACE collects, aggregates and analyses network informations coming from probes
deployed over the network and customer node. Confirmed alerts are sent to the
Policy Instantiation Engine (PIE);
• The PIE receives confirmed alert from the ACE, sets the severity level and the extent
of the network response (depending on the alert layer). The PIE instantiates high
level alert messages which have to be deployed. Finally the high level alert messages
are transferred to the Reaction Deployment Point (RDP);
• The RDP (Fig. 3) is composed of two modules. The Cryptography Analysis (CA)
is in charge of analyzing the keys previously instantiated by the PIE. Therefore, the
Crypto Status stores required properties for a secure asymetric key so that the CA
module is able to check the eligibilty of the newly received key to be deployed. Con-
cretely the CA will check the key strength, if the key has not been used or revoked,
test if the cryptographic key is not badly generated (modulus-facotrization, etc.).
The second module, the Component Configuration Mapper, selects the appropriate
communication channel.
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The reaction mechanism (Fig. 2) aims at adapting the ciffering of the data according
to the bank interface whenever on alert occurs. This section presents the core components
of the reaction mechanism. Agents are disseminated on three layers corresponding to
the clearing mechanism1 (customer/issuer, acquiring/issuing processing) and they retrieve
information from probes located at the network layer and representing different values:
network traffic, DoS attack (denial-of-service attack, an attempt to make a computer
resource unavailable to its intended users), suspicious connections attempts, ... .
Fig. 2: Reaction mechanism inside
Fig. 3: RDP architecture
Fig. 4: SAVP architecture
Fig. 4 presents two different kinds of Signature Agent Verification Point (SAVP).
Indeed, another advantage of MAS is that it is easy to implement from a model, specific
1 Clearing denotes all activities from the time a commitment is made for a transaction until is settled.
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agents in order to performs specific tasks. Concretely it is adapted to the usage and
practical deployment in that it coincides (e.g. shop terminal, smartphone, ATM, etc.) and
sends alerts to appropriate level (cutsomer, processing, clearing). Moreover, our attack
prevention system is easily extensible for future interface category. SAVPs receive generic
alert messages from the RDP. Then a specific parser converts the incoming key type to
the appropriate format according to the interface.
In order to consider the mutual trust between agents, each agent is associated to a
database of levels of trust towards its pairs. This means e.g. that the SAVP has a
dedicated level of trust for the ACE and the RDP. This database can be accessed by
Utopia [SBAG11], the MAS framework we use to control the assignment of responsibility
in an intelligent manner by taking the level of trust between agents into account. The
reaction alert architecture presented in this section is based on the ReD (Reaction after
Detection) project [FKA10]. The ReD project defines and designs a solution to enhance the
detection/reaction process and improves the overall resilience of critical infrastructures.
Fig. 5 introduces the developed architecture illustrated with our clearing network alert
system. The flow is supposed to begin with an alert detected by a probe (connected to
the SAVP at the bottom of the figure).
This alert is sent to the ACE agent (customer layer) that does or does not confirm the
alert to the PIE. Afterwards, the PIE decides to adapt key or to forward the alert to an
ACE of a higher layer (acquiring/issuring). The PIE agent sends key policy to the RDP
agent, which decides which SAVP is able to transform the high level alert message into
an understandable format for the selected interface category. In order to manage access
rights, we have incorporated to ReD a Context Rights Management module (CRM). Block
on the right on Fig. 5. The CRM is in charge of providing access rights to agents (E.g.
SAVP to the probes and Logs File database, RDP to the keys Status database). The CRM
uses the rights and the crisis context database and is able to detect changes in the situation
thanks to Utopia functions. The first database includes the access rights corresponding
to the responsibilities and the second database includes a set of crisis contexts. Thanks
to these databases the CRM agent is able to provide adequate rights at operational layer
to an agent depending on the context.
3 Agent Responsibility Model
In a non-crisis context, agents are assigned to responsibilities like RDP, PIE, SAVP, etc.
Those assignments of responsibilities to agents require specific access rights. By analyzing
for instance the activity of monitoring the bank Internet access (Fig. 5), we can e.g.
observe that the SAVP’s have the responsibility to collect the number of connection from
different IP adresses (to prevent DoS attack) or the location of the connection, to make
a basic correlation between the values and the antecedent values records (stocked in the
Logs File database) and to report this analysis to the ACE in case of suspected alert. To
perform the monitoring activity, the SAVP are assigned to precise obligations and gain
corresponding access rights recorded in the access right database Those rights are e.g.:
access to the log file or network ATM. When a crisis occurs, for instance if a DoS is detected
and isolates some SAVP agents from the rest of the network, the normal monitoring rules
and procedures do no longer work as usual and it is requested to change the responsibility
of the agents. In the above case, other agents have to assure the responsibilities of the
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Fig. 5: Detailed reaction architecture for the clearing infrastructure
isolated SAVP. To assure their new responsibilities the agents request additional access
rights e.g. monitoring probes related to the isolated ATM.
In practice, the automatic assignment of rights to agents depending on their respon-
sibilities is not immediate and this contradicts the need to react promptly to the attack
or to the problem. To tackle the weakness, our approach is based on the refinement of
the agent responsibility and on the granting of access rights based on responsibility. The
right management module exploits two databases accessed by the CRM agent. The first
database includes the rights corresponding to the responsibilities and the second includes
a set of crisis contexts. Each crisis context defines, depending on the type of crisis, which
agent is assigned to which responsibility.
The review of the literature highlights that the definition of the agent responsibility is
mostly incomplete and that most of the architecture only considering the agent against
the outcome that he has to produce. Sometimes, advanced solutions integrate the inputs
that those agents request to perform the outcome. We define responsibility as a state
assigned to an agent to signify him its obligations concerning the task, its accountabilities
regarding its obligations, and the rights and capabilities necessary to perform it.
In order to integrate a dynamic re-assignment of the responsibility from one agent
working in normal conditions to one agent working in a crisis environment, we consider all
the concepts which compose the responsibility. In [FP09] we have proposed a responsibility
model that can be used to depict the agent responsibility. This model integrates the main
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following concepts:
Obligation is a duty which links a responsibility with a task that must be performed.
Accountability is a duty to justify achievement, maintenance or avoidance of some
given state to an authority under the threat of sanction [Sta06]. Accountability contribute
to generate trust or to remove trust depending of the accountability outcomes.
Right encompasses facilities required by an agent to fulfill its obligations, e.g. the
access right that the agent gets once it is assigned responsible.
Capability describes the requisite qualities, skills or resources necessary to perform a
task. Capability may be declined through knowledge or know-how, possessed by the agent
such as ability to make a decision, its processing time, its faculty to analyze a problem,
and its position on the network.
Fig. 6: Agent responsibility model
Commitment pledged by the agent represents its engagement to fulfill a task and the
assurance that it does it in respect of good practices. The commitment in MAS has already
been subject to many researches as explained in [Sin08]. The semantic analyzes commit-
ment [SD09] and [MDHV02] advocates to consider the mutual trust between agents as
a pragmatic commitment antecedent [GBKD07]. The trust component signifies the lower
trust value that is necessary for an agent to be assigned responsible and is determined by
the importance of the obligation that is to be achieved.
Based on the agent responsibility model of Fig. 6, we define the responsibilities for
each agent of the architecture. Table 1 summarizes the SAVP and the ACE responsibilities
used in practice for the dynamic assignment (section 4). Due to the extent of this paper,
only the responsibility for two of them is presented: the SAVP and the ACE, and only
the 4 most significant components of the responsible are exploited: Obligations, Trust,
Capabilities and Rights.
For the SAVP, we observe that responsibility includes obligations such as the obligation
to retrieve logs from the component it monitors (ATM, IP network, shop VISA interface,
...), to provide an immediate reaction if necessary, to report the incident to the RDP, etc.
To perform this obligation, it needs the capabilities to be on the same network as the
component it controls and to communicate with the ACE and the facilitator agent. It also
must have the right to read log on the ATM or other interface category parameters on the
concerned network component and to write the values down in a central logs database.
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Obligations Trust Capabilities Rights
SAVP
• Retrieve the logs
from the component
it monitors;
• Provide an immedi-
ate reaction if neces-
sary;
• Communicate with
the facilitator to get
the address of the
other components
(ACE, CRM);
• Report the incident
to the ACE.
0.8
• SAVP must be on
the same network
as the parameter
(browser, ATM,
shop, etc.) it
monitors;
• SAVP must be able
to communicate
with the ACE and
the facilitator agent.
Read parameter value
on the concerned net-
work component Write
parameter value in the
central logs database
ACE
• Decide which keys
are appropriated to
be deployed by the
SAVP;
• Confirm the alert to
the PIE;
• Communicate with
the facilitator to get
the address of the
other components
(SAVP, CRM).
0.9
• Fast bandwidth;
• High CPU re-
sources;
• Central position on
the network.
• No specific
right.
Tab. 1: Agents Responsibilities Specifications
4 Responsibility to Agent Assignement
To assign responsibilities to agents, we have associated our architecture with Utopia an
insTitution Oriented ProgrammIng frAmework which aims at simplify agent based insti-
tutions programming. This architecture provides organizational specification for agents
institutions usingMoiseInst.
Fig. 7: MoiseInst organization
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MoiseInst (Fig. 7.) is an Organization Specification (OS) system composed of four
dimensions:
• Structural Specification (SS);
• Functional Specification (FS);
• Contextual Specification (CS);
• Normative Specification (NS).
These specifications are described in a XML file and loaded by Utopia. From this
defined organization, Utopia instantiates a framework allowing to specify responsibilities
and trust, and as consequence, to establish the agent responsible in terms of tasks, obli-
gations, rights and trust. In the following, we explain the Structural and the Functional
Specifications which are related to the trust parameter. The paper [GBKD07] addresses
these specifications in details.
The Structural Specification (Fig. 8) defines (i) the responsibilities which agents are
assigned to in the Organization (ii) the relations between the responsibilities in terms
of data exchange during the execution of the tasks. E.g. <Link source=”SAVP” destina-
tion=”ACE”/> specifies that the SAVP is allowed to send information to the ACE (iii)
the Groups of agents assigned to the same responsibility. E.g. <Responsibility id=”SAVP”
min=”3” max=”3”/> creates a SAVP group with a cardinality sets to 3. And (iv) the
initial level of trust of each agent. E.g. According to Fig. 8 the level of trust for the ACE
is set to 0.5 at boot. This value will change over the time based on acknowledgment and
task performance.
Fig. 8: Structural Specification schema
In case of a crisis, if a SAVP from a SAVP group is corrupted, the responsibility of
that failing agent is transferred to new agents from the same group.
The Functional Specification (FS) on Fig. 9 defines global business processes that can
be executed by the different agents participating to the Organization according to their
responsibilities and Groups.
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Fig. 9: Functional Specification schema
5 Trust and reputation management
The trust and reputation model (TRM) evaluates the responsability fulfillment of each
component involved in the architecture. A large review of computational trust models can
be found in [SS05] and more details for cognitive aspects of trust is presented in [CF98].
The proposed reputation-based trust management scheme is used to predict the future
behavior of a component in order to establish trust among agents and hence to improve
security in the system. The way trust information is quantified depends on the applica-
tion field. Some authors used probabilistic approaches [VMC10] [PTJL05] [MMA+01] to
quantify trust. This approach is used in several fields such as Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,
Social Networks or e-commerce. Other approaches such as Fuzzy approaches or Bayesian
networks [BB04][BB02][TPJL06] are also exploited to quantify trust with some differences,
if a ageing factor is used or not, the way reputation parameters are aggregated. The infor-
mation needed to evaluate the trustworthiness of a component is provided by the SAVP’s
probe.
Fig. 10: Reputation Repartion Schema
As mentioned in the agent responsibility specifications, if one of the SAVP’s agents
is not trustworthy because for instance it has been corrupted, it has to be removed and
10 Submitted to SAR-SSI 2011
FCI: A MAS Trusted Architecture for Alert Detection and Authenticated Transaction
replaced. The assignment of a new responsibility to another SAVP (SAVP1 or SAVP2 in
Fig. 10) is done based on the trust value of that agent.
5.1 Computing trust and reputation
The trust (T) and reputation (R) of each component is provided by trust assessment
regarding an SAVP agent based on direct information collected by the SAVP agents himself
and by second hand-information coming from other ACE to which it belongs. This trust
based reputation is calculated at time t as follows:
TACE1−SAV P2 = RACE1−SAV P2 = DRACE1−SAV P2 (1)
Where DRACE1−SAV P2 is the reputation derived from the direct reputation of SAVP2
in the view of ACE1. The scenario depicted in Fig. 10 shows that ACE1 has no direct
connectivity with SAVP2 and has to rely on information coming from ACE2. In this case
(1) leads to (2):
TACE1−SAV P2 = RACE1−SAV P2 = DRACE1−SAV P2 + λ ∗ IRACE1−SAV P2 (2)
Where λ is the weighted factor associated to the reputation value and IRACE1−SAV P2
is the indirect reputation value provided by other agents about agent SAVP2. In the
followings we presented how the direct reputation (DR) and the indirect reputation (IR)
are calculated. The direct reputation is defined as the probability evaluated by ACE1
that ACE2 will achieve his goal at the next solicitation. Several approaches can be used
to deal with reputation information such as Beta, Gaussian, Poisson, binomial. [BB02]
prooves that the Beta distribution system is the most promising due to its flexibility and
simplicity as well as its strong foundation on the theory of statistics.
Our model used the Beta probability density function Beta(α, β) as shown in equation
(3) to represent direct reputation.
p(θ) = Beta(α, β) = Γ(α+ β)Γ(α)Γ(β)θ
α−1θβ−1 (3)
Where θ represents the probability that the next event will occur. This Beta function
is indexed with two parameters α and β, which represent the sum of positive and negative
assessment, respectively that ACE1 has for ACE2. We consider that ACE1 rates ACE2
during an assessment in a binary scale (positive (1), negative (0)). The direct reputation
value is the mean of the Beta distribution between ACE1 and ACE2. Reputation value
for agent ACE2 about agent ACE1 is calculated as the expectation value of Beta(α, β)
with E equal the standard deviation :
RACE1−ACE2 = E(Beta(α, β)) (4)
An agent ACE1 is trusted by agent ACE2 if and only if RACE1−ACE2 ≤ τ where τ is a
threshold value from which the agent is considered trustworthy. This threshold is defined
by the responsibilities specifications. For instance, the trust threshold for SAVP agents is
set to 0.8. Initially, α = β = 0, which corresponds to uniform distribution and indicates
absence of knowledge.
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RACE1−ACE2 = E(Beta(α, β)) =
α+ 1
α+ β + 2 (5)
The update of this reputation value is done with respect to the Beta function. This
trust represents the trustworthiness of one agent to another. In order to highlight the
impact of recent behavior, the ageing factor is introduced. We assume that this ageing
factor g depends on the context. This value is update in (6) as follows:
αnewACE1−ACE2 = g ∗ αACE1−ACE2 and βnewACE1−ACE2 = g ∗ βACE1−ACE2 (6)
A small value of g gives more weight to recent trust values. However choosing the
right value of g is not straightforward. For this purpose, we assume that the value of g
is chosen by a Human at the initialization of the system. Unlike the components weights
which represents the personal view that an agent has to another.
Our solution for setting components weights is based on the similarity beliefs between
two agents. This similarity is based on the assumption that if two agents rate a third agent
in the same way, this means that they have similar beliefs and views of this agent. Given
two agents ACE1 and ACE2, let the set (ACE1, ACE2) be the set of all mutual agents,
that both ACE1 and ACE2 have interacted with and hence have a direct reputation with
those agents in (7) as follows:
Set(ACE1, ACE2) = {c, d, e, ..., n} (7)
The similarity belief (Λ) between those two agents is given in (8).
Λ = Sim(ACE1, ACE2) = 1−Dis(ACE1, ACE2) (8)
Where the distance function between 2 agents ACE1, ACE2 is calculated in (9) based
on the Euclidian method.
Dis(ACE1, ACE2) =
√ ∑
i∈Set(ACE1,ACE2)
(RACE1−ACEi −RACE2−ACEi)2 (9)
By doing that, an agent can have no common direct history with another and in the
same time have a trustworthy (or not) view of that agent.
Agents ACE1 ACE2 λ CRM CRM
SAVP1 unknown 0.6 unknown 0.8
SAVP2 unknown 0.8 unknown 0.9
SAVP3 unknown 0.1 unknown 0.16
ACE1 0.8 0.6 0.8
ACE2 0.9 0.7 0.7
Tab. 2: Example of Reputation Calculation
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Table 2 represents the reputation value that the agents have for each other based on
their common past interaction history. The grey boxes represent the reputation that agent
has about itself. This is not possible since we assume that reputation is not reflexive. The
unknown value means that Utopia has no common history with that agent.
5.2 Example of responsibility assignments based on reputation.
In a normal situation one agent is assigned to a SAVP responsibility, each agent is asso-
ciated to one or more probes (ATM, IP network,...) and reports to the ACE. Each time
a SAVP agent wants to access a component of the network, it previously needs to contact
the CRM that consults the access rights database in order to retrieve the rights associated
to the responsibility assigned to the agent.
Based on the values of the Table 2, CRM allows to transfer the responsibilities of the
corrupted agent.
During an abnormal situation, the context evolves and an appropriate crisis context
should be selected. Each context is adapted to a specific case. In this use case, the
crisis concerns the corruption of the SAVP3 agent and calls for a transfer of that agent
responsibility from the corrupted agent to another agent from the same group. That
transfer of responsibility implies, in the mean time, a transfer of access rights.
The diagram of activities, as highlighted by white numbers in black circles on Fig. 5,
is the following:
1. Under a threshold of 0.5, CRM considers that an agent is no longer trustworthy.
According to Table 2, the trust level of the SAVP3 is set to 0.16. Consequently the
CRM adapts and sends the new crisis context to Utopia. Based on that context,
the CRM is able to update the access rights data base;
2. Afterwards, the SAVP3 loses its access rights and is isolated, and the responsibilities
of SAVP3 are transferred to the SAVP2 which has a reputation of 0.9;
3. The agent SAVP2 that receive the additional SAVP3 responsibilities requests the
access rights corresponding to that responsibility to the CRM.
6 Conclusions
Critical infrastructures are more and more present and needs to be seriously managed and
monitored regarding the increasing amount of threats. This paper presents a solution for
bank clearing security using a MAS based architecture. The system, initially developed
based on static assignments of responsibilities to agents, has needs for more dynamism
in order to keep aligned to the new arising risks. This paper firstly addresses the new
challenge by providing a framework for dynamically assigning responsibilities to agents
depending on the crisis context. That contextualized responsibility assignment permits,
in fine, to manage the agent access rights to critical information. Secondly, the paper
enhances that dynamic assignment taking into account the trust and reputation between
the agents during the assignment mechanism.
The architecture we exploit to demonstrate the enhanced reaction mechanism, relies
on the two main pillars ReD and Utopia, which are being tested and currently produced
in our labs. Practically ReD defines the structural bases for the clearing mechanism and
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Utopia permits to deploy the responsibilities to agents. The paper is illustrated based on
a use case that shows how the transfer of rights for a corrupted SAVP is performed during
an evolution from normal to crisis situation.
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